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Since the adoption of  the UN Trafficking Protocol, most of  the efforts 
dedicated to eliminating exploitation of  migrant workers have focused on 
human trafficking. Yet, there is limited evidence to show that this approach 
has been effective at reducing the scale or severity of  abuses they experience. 
This article presents the case for increasing attention to a range of  labour rights 
abuses falling under the category of  wage theft. It considers the opportunities 
to shift the strategy for responding to exploitation, addressing the underlying 
pecuniary issues as a chief  priority rather than as a matter of  secondary concern. 
The analysis concludes that expanding engagement with the more ‘mundane’ 
vulnerabilities to abuse is essential to developing a pragmatic approach that 
enables migrants themselves to identify and denounce abuses. Interventions to 
prevent and remediate wage theft would contribute to better working conditions 
for the vast missing middle who experience more commonplace forms of  abuse 
and help to diminish the enabling environment for severe exploitation to occur. 
Ensuring a more equitable distribution of  wages would also redirect attention 
to a core issue at stake in the era of  globalisation—the expansion of  economic 
and social justice for migrant workers.
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The attention paid to exploitation within the global economy has never been 
greater. Since the adoption of  the UN Trafficking Protocol, the lion’s share of  
the efforts and resources have been focused on responding to human trafficking. 
Hundreds of  millions of  dollars are spent every year on counter-trafficking 
efforts,1 with a specific emphasis on investigation and criminal prosecution, raids 
to ‘rescue’ sex workers classified as potential victims, shelter and ‘rehabilitation’ 
services for survivors, and trainings to raise awareness among those who might 
experience or encounter human trafficking.
More recently, the emergence of  the modern slavery discourse has emphasised 
the role of  businesses in perpetuating the exploitation of  workers. Against the 
background of  a worldwide pursuit of  ever cheaper labour and reduced regulation, 
more responsible practices by the private sector have been widely heralded as a 
force for change.2 In response, auditing of  supply chains, certification regimes, 
and enactment of  legislation that requires corporate disclosures on sourcing 
have increased dramatically.3 Non-binding ‘commitments’ to pay a living wage 
in supplier factories have been made by some of  the world’s largest garment 
companies, such as H&M, Primark, and PVH.4 
Technological solutions have also been posited as key to solving the problem 
of  human trafficking.5 Models for expanding ‘worker voice’ have made use 
of  smart phone apps to encourage migrants to report cases of  exploitation.6 
 
1 M Ucnikova, ‘OECD and Modern Slavery: How much aid money is spent to tackle 
the issue?’, Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 3, 2014, pp. 133-150, https://doi.org/10.14197/
atr.20121437.
2 A Gallagher, ‘Four dangerous assumptions about human trafficking’, World Economic 
Forum, 16 August 2017.
3 International Corporate Accountability Roundtable and Focus on Labour Exploitation, 
Full Disclosure: Towards better modern slavery reporting, London, 2019.
4 R Edwards, T Hunt, and G LeBaron, Corporate Commitments to Living Wages in the Garment 
Industry, University of  Sheffield, 2019.
5 K Guilbert, ‘UK Royal, US Ambassador Tout Tech Tools to Tackle Human Trafficking’, 
Reuters, 9 April 2019, retrieved 31 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
global-trafficking-technology/uk-royal-us-ambassador-tout-tech-tools-to-tackle-
human-trafficking-idUSKCN1RK2C1.
6 L Rende Taylor and E Shih, ‘Worker Feedback Technologies and Combatting Modern 
Slavery in Global Supply Chains’, Journal of  the British Academy, vol. 7, issue s1, 2019, 
pp. 131-165, https://doi.org/10.5871/jba/007s1.131.
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Satellite imagery has been employed to attempt to identify modern slavery 
situations from space through locating brick kilns.7 Blockchain technology has 
been trumpeted as a potential solution to problems with contract substitution.8 
Big data is presented as a means for improving the evidence base for interventions 
to counter trafficking in persons.9
Yet, there is still limited evidence to show that these efforts have been effective.10 
The quality of  empirical data available to justify anti-trafficking initiatives 
has lagged behind their ever-expanding scope. Due to the lack of  rigorous 
evidence of  a long-term impact, the rhetoric and hyperbole of  anti-trafficking 
organisations continue to escalate to present a compelling case for additional 
funding and support. Anachronistically referencing the abolitionist movements 
of  prior centuries, their beneficiaries are now described as having been ‘liberated 
from slavery’ in some cases.11
Many of  these initiatives have specifically targeted migrant workers due to 
their heightened vulnerability to severe forms of  exploitation. However, there 
is reason to believe that less acute abuses are much more common and have 
even become normalised in some contexts. For example, a recent study in 
Australia found that nearly half  of  all migrant workers were paid below the 
legal minimum wage.12 These ‘everyday’ abuses have received much less 
attention in recent years. The relevant international labour standard, the 
Protection of  Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), has become so outdated that 
it includes articles prohibiting ‘payment of  wages in taverns’. Nevertheless, 
estimates of  the scale of  wage violations suggest that they are one of  the most 
significant forms of  labour exploitation, costing low-wage workers USD 50 
7 D Boyd et al., ‘Slavery from Space: Demonstrating the role for satellite remote sensing 
to inform evidence-based action related to UN SDG number 8’, Journal of  Photogrammetry 
and Remote Sensing , vol. 142, 2018, pp. 380-388, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
isprsjprs.2018.02.012.
8 G Chavez-Dreyfuss, ‘Coca-Cola, U.S. State Dept to use blockchain to combat forced 
labor’, Reuters, 17 March 2018, retrieved 31 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-blockchain-coca-cola-labor/coca-cola-u-s-state-dept-to-use-blockchain-to-
combat-forced-labor-idUSKCN1GS2PY.
9 T Sneed, ‘How Big Data Battles Human Trafficking’, U.S. News & World Report, 14 
January 2015, https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/14/how-big-data-
is-being-used-in-the-fight-against-human-trafficking.
10 B Harkins, ‘Constraints to a Robust Evidence Base for Anti-Trafficking Interventions’, 
Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 8, 2017, pp. 113-130, https://doi.org/10.14197/atr. 
20121787.
11 Ibid.
12 L Berg and B Farbenblum, Wage Theft in Australia: Findings of  the National Temporary 
Migrant Work survey, University of  New South Wales, 2017.
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billion per year in the United States alone.13 
This article examines the case for an increased focus on financial abuses 
against migrant workers under the rubric of  ‘wage theft’. It presents the 
key arguments for an emphasis on wage-related violations, including the 
structural vulnerabilities created by restrictive migration governance regimes, 
the unsuitability of  the human trafficking and modern slavery frameworks 
for resolving these abuses, and the necessity of  developing a more pragmatic 
approach to counter exploitation. The analysis concludes by considering 
strategies for shifting the response to the exploitation of  migrants, addressing 
the underlying pecuniary issues as a chief  priority rather than as a matter of  
secondary concern.
The article is based on a review of  the relevant academic and practice-oriented 
resources and also draws on primary data collected on complaint cases for the 
report Access to Justice for Migrant Workers in Southeast Asia.14 The findings were 
validated and improved through a review by several leading experts working in 
the fields of  labour migration and anti-trafficking.
Many Forms of Wage Theft are Neglected
Although there is no internationally accepted definition of  the concept of  
wage theft, it can be conceived as an amalgamation of  a number of  different 
types of  labour rights abuses related to the denial of  remuneration or benefits 
to a worker to whom they are owed or entitled. Not all forms of  wage theft are 
considered to be indicative of  forced labour or human trafficking, particularly 
those which are financially extractive but not explicitly coercive in nature (e.g. 
wages below the legal minimum or misclassification of  employment). However, 
outright coercion or deception by employers may be unnecessary in contexts 
where migrants’ rights are heavily restricted and few alternative livelihoods 
are available. This has created a practical gap in the legal and institutional 
frameworks addressing exploitation of  migrants in many countries, where more 
routine wage abuses are often neglected or marginalised. 
Descriptions of  some of  the more common types of  wage theft committed 
against migrant workers and their relationship to ILO guidance on indicators of  
forced labour are provided below:
13 C McNicholas, Z Mokhiber, and A Chaikof, ‘Two billion dollars in stolen wages were 
recovered for workers in 2015 and 2016—and that’s just a drop in the bucket’, 
Economic Policy Institute, 13 December 2017.
14 B Harkins and M Åhlberg, Access to Justice for Migrant Workers in Southeast Asia, ILO, 
Bangkok, 2017.
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Non-payment of  wages: Not providing the full remuneration due for work 
performed at the end of  a pay period. It is accepted to be an indicator of  forced 
labour if  the abuse is carried out in a ‘deliberate and systematic manner’.15 
In such cases, non-payment is considered a form of  coercion, with migrant 
workers unable to leave their employment due to wages owed.
Lack of  overtime pay: Not paying, or not paying at a higher rate, for working 
hours that extend beyond the standard length of  work day or week. It is a 
common form of  abuse against migrant workers as they frequently are required 
to work long hours and may have difficulty determining when they are entitled 
to overtime pay. While excessive overtime is recognised as an indicator of  forced 
labour, lack of  overtime pay in itself  is not considered to be sufficient.16
Wages below the legal minimum: Payment of  wages at a level that does not 
meet statutory requirements. Enforcement is typically more limited for migrant 
workers and they are more commonly employed in informal sectors which 
are exempted from minimum wage requirements. They also frequently receive 
wages determined by piece work, a share system (e.g. share of  the catch in 
fishing), or gratuities, which heightens the risk of  under-payment. Not paying 
the minimum wage is not acknowledged to be an indicator of  forced labour, 
though receiving very low levels of  remuneration clearly constrains the mobility 
and welfare of  migrants. 
Illegal wage deductions: Deduction from the pay of  migrant workers for 
various costs and fees that are not permitted under law, including charging for 
fraudulent expenses, applying exorbitant rates, or passing on costs meant to be 
borne by employers. These abuses are often difficult to identify as a wide variety 
of  deductions are typically permitted—including recruitment and migration- 
related costs—and there may be a lack of  transparency about the charges or 
balances due. Wage deductions are only considered an indicator of  forced 
labour to the extent that they constitute ‘debt bondage’, though the distinction 
is not entirely clear.17 
Non-provision of  benefits: Not making required contributions to social 
protection schemes or providing direct benefits such as housing or paid leave 
that are stipulated under law. In particular, many employers avoid making 
compulsory payments for social security, healthcare, or compensation for 
workplace accidents due to lack of  awareness of  entitlements among migrant 
workers. These abuses are not formally recognised as an indicator of  forced 
labour.





Discriminatory wage setting: Paying a different wage to workers doing the 
same job (or a job of  equal value) but who differ with respect to a personal 
characteristic such as nationality, race, gender, or sexual orientation. Although 
there is substantial research showing that inequitable wages are widespread 
for certain demographic groups—particularly women and migrant workers— 
proving that the differences are the result of  discrimination is often challenging.18 
Discriminatory pay practices are not interpreted to be an indicator of  forced 
labour.
Misclassification of  employment: The intentional mischaracterisation of  a 
worker’s employment status as a contractor to avoid payment of  higher wages 
or provision of  entitlements. An increasingly common form of  wage theft with 
the growth of  non-standard forms of  work, misclassification can result in grave 
repercussions for migrant workers by muddying the statutory responsibilities of  
their employers. However, it is not considered to be indicative of  forced labour.
Wage Exploitation is a Key Motivation for Employing 
Migrant Workers
Traditional macroeconomic push and pull models for understanding migration 
flows use wage differentials between countries of  origin and destination as a 
core variable for explaining migration. These theories predict that the number of  
individuals who consider migration to be an optimal choice increases in relation 
to discrepancies in pay.19 Potential migrants are typically assumed to have the 
information available to accurately estimate the costs and benefits involved in 
migration and make a rational choice on whether to migrate.
Research has shown that these models are not borne out empirically and tend 
to be relatively poor predictors of  international migration.20 They have been 
criticised for isolating individuals from the surrounding social and political 
forces influencing their decisions, including the extent to which governments 
attempt to facilitate or block migration.
 
18 ILO, Global Wage Report 2018/19: What lies behind gender pay gaps, ILO, Geneva, 2018; 
C Bartolucci, ‘Understanding the Native–Immigrant Wage Gap Using Matched 
Employer-Employee Data: Evidence from Germany’, ILR Review, vol. 67, no. 4, 2014, 
pp. 1166–1202, https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793914546300.
19 C Dustmann, ‘Return Migration, Wage Differentials, and the Optimal Migration 
Duration’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 264, Bonn, 2001.
20 F Cuamea Velázquez, ‘Approaches to the Study of  International Migration: A review’, 
Estudios Fronterizos, vol. 1, no. 1, 2000, pp. 137-168, https://doi.org/10.21670/
ref.2000.01.a04.
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While the decisions of  workers to migrate cannot be reduced to the wages on 
offer, the motivations for employers to recruit migrants are in many cases easier 
to comprehend. Within a globalised economy, choices about where to source or 
manufacture products are frequently based on the availability of  low-cost labour 
and a permissive environment for industry. As opposed to migrant workers 
themselves who often have very limited information available,21 multinational 
companies conduct detailed assessments of  labour markets and regulatory 
frameworks before making decisions about where and how to do business.
As labour is typically the largest cost of  outsourced production, multinational 
firms actively comparison shop to find labour markets which offer the greatest 
reduction in worker wages.22 This creates enormous pressure on their upstream 
suppliers to constantly pursue lower labour costs, making the employment of  
migrant workers at exploitative pay levels close to an economic necessity. In 
labour intensive industries such as sugar cane, garments, chocolate, seafood and 
electronics, these market forces create business models which are only able to 
remain profitable due to various forms of  wage theft.23 
The recent expansion of  corporate social responsibility initiatives has not 
been successful in addressing these labour abuses,24 and has had the effect of  
marginalising the plight of  migrant workers outside global supply chains who 
are equally vulnerable. These efforts have sought to leverage a ‘neoliberal ethics 
of  the self ’, with the notion that abuses can be stopped through demands 
for greater corporate transparency and consumer activism.25 However, only 
workers whose conditions are highlighted by their proximity to markets in the 
Global North are understood to deserve attention, and the power is placed in 
the hands of  consumers and corporations to effect change rather than workers 
themselves.26 Abuse of  migrant workers in industries serving domestic markets 
is therefore rendered immaterial.
 
21 B Harkins, D Lindgren, and T Suravoranon, Risks and Rewards: Outcomes of  labour 
migration in South-East Asia, ILO and IOM, Bangkok, 2017.
22 O Knack, ‘Side-by-side: Top 4 Asian countries for manufacturing garments’, Asia 
Quality Focus, 15 August 2017, retrieved 31 July 2020, https://www.intouch-quality.
com/blog/side-by-side-top-4-asian-countries-for-manufacturing-garments.
23 G LeBaron et al., Confronting Root Causes: Forced labour in global supply chains, 
openDemocracy and University of  Sheffield, 2018, pp. 42-44.
24 Ibid.
25 S Molland, ‘What Happened to Sex Trafficking? The new moral panic of  men, boys 
and fish in the Mekong region’, Sojourn: Journal of  Social Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. 34, 
no. 2, 2019, pp. 397–424.




Migration for domestic work in Malaysia provides a case in point. In recent 
years, the Malaysian government has sought bilateral agreements with a growing 
number of  countries to meet the demand for low-cost domestic services. This 
was necessary because Indonesia and Cambodia halted deployment of  domestic 
workers to the country due to widespread reports of  abuse. The impact of  these 
bans was deeply felt in Malaysia as perceptions of  a ‘maid shortage’ triggered 
deeper cultural anxieties about economic malaise.27 In response, Malaysia held 
bilateral talks with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar to expand the number 
of  domestic workers available but did not offer coverage by the minimum 
wage.28 Without government efforts to maintain exploitative wage levels, the 
vast majority of  Malaysians would simply be unable to afford full-time domestic 
workers living in their homes.
Restrictive Labour Migration Regimes Create Structural 
Vulnerabilities to Wage Theft
The basic premise for admitting migrant workers to a destination country is 
typically to address a labour shortage in a particular sector or geographic region. 
If  admission of  migrants can hold down wages in these industries or areas, the 
economy is seen as benefitting from the increased supply of  low-cost labour. At 
the same time, governments are under competing pressure to prevent the wages 
of  local workers from being depressed. Therefore, regulatory procedures for 
admission and employment are established to channel migrant workers into the 
specific jobs to be filled to support complementarity rather than competition 
with national workers.29
To maintain these objectives, policies on temporary labour migration in 
destination countries typically provide very limited flexibility for migrant 
workers to change jobs of  their own volition. Their legal status is usually directly 
tied to their employer, preventing them from leaving their employment without 
losing permission to stay and work. There are few examples within OECD 
countries where migrants are granted unrestricted access to the labour market 
and the opportunities in many Asian and Middle Eastern countries are even 
more limited.30
27 J Elias and J Louth, ‘Producing Migrant Domestic Work: Exploring the everyday 
political economy of  Malaysia’s “maid shortage”’, Globalizations, vol. 13, issue 6, 2016, 
pp. 830–845, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2016.1155340.
28 B Harkins, Review of  Labour Migration Policy in Malaysia, ILO, Bangkok, 2016.
29 M Abella and P Martin, Manual on Measuring Migration Policy Impacts in ASEAN, ILO, 
Bangkok, 2015.
30 S Kouba and N Baruah, Access to the Labour Market for Admitted Migrant Workers in Asia 
and Related Corridors, ILO, Bangkok, 2019.
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These restrictions on the ability of  migrant workers to change employers can 
lead to structural vulnerabilities to abuse by creating a dependency that can easily 
be exploited. As elaborated by De Genova in his concept of  ‘deportability’, the 
ever-present threat of  expulsion has a disciplinary effect on the behaviour of  
migrant workers.31 They cannot easily leave situations of  wage theft or register 
complaints without fear of  retaliation and loss of  legal status. In addition, the 
opportunity for migrants to organise into trade unions for collective bargaining 
is restricted within many destination countries, either by law or in practice.32 
Because of  this imbalance of  power within the employment relationship, 
migrant workers often have limited ability to negotiate over wages or benefits.
With these enabling factors in place, wage theft cannot be regarded as an 
unintended consequence of  restrictive labour migration governance regimes. 
Systematic measures to decrease the ability of  migrant workers to avoid, seek 
redress, or leave abusive situations have a calculated recoupment effect on wage 
payments. It has been argued that the cost of  migrants’ rights is in fact directly 
priced into the formulation of  migration policies in destination countries.33 
Therefore, a rebalancing requires expanding the power of  workers to demand 
fair wages and benefits and obtain satisfactory financial remedies if  they are not 
provided.
Lack of Coverage by Wage Protection Enables 
Discriminatory Pay Practices
Migrant workers are more commonly employed in informal sectors of  work 
which are not fully covered by labour laws than nationals.34 As a result, they 
are exempted from key wage protections such as a legal minimum or overtime 
pay. This contributes to artificially low wages and segmentation within national 
labour markets. A substantial body of  evidence shows that workers in the 
informal economy are among the most vulnerable to labour rights abuses due to 
their exclusion from these legal protections.35
 
31 N P De Genova, ‘Migrant “Illegality” and Deportability in Everyday Life’, Annual 
Review of  Anthropology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2002, pp. 419–447, https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.anthro.31.040402.085432.
32 ILO, Addressing Governance Challenges in a Changing Labour Migration Landscape, ILO, 
Geneva, 2017.
33 M Ruhs, The Price of  Rights: Regulating international labor migration, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2013.
34 N Popova and M H Özel, Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers, ILO, Geneva, 
2018.




Globally, migrant domestic workers are recognised as facing some of  the 
most abusive pay practices, including withholding, non-payment, and under-
payment of  wages.36 Just as women are typically expected to do the majority 
of  the household work without pay, migrant domestic workers—who are 
predominantly women—are expected to work for little pay. This reflects a 
devaluing of  the occupation because it is traditionally viewed as an inherent 
responsibility of  women rather than a form of  work. Domestic workers are 
commonly expected to put in excessively long hours without overtime pay 
or paid leave since they are considered to be ‘part of  the family’ rather than 
legitimate workers requiring formal labour and social protections.37 
The fragmentation of  employment relationships in recent decades has also led 
to a decline in wage protections within sectors that employ migrant workers. 
Research on migrant construction work in the Middle East has shown that 
delayed payment and wage theft are widespread; linked to obsolete payment 
systems that have not kept pace with the growth of  non-standard forms of  
work.38 Due to externalised working arrangements through outsourcing and 
temporary staffing agencies, the main employers of  the migrant workforce 
often have less legal responsibility for the pay and benefits they provide. At the 
same time, increasingly competitive bidding for construction project tenders 
has ratcheted up pressure to reduce labour costs through any means necessary, 
including sub-legal wage levels, non-payment of  wages, and misclassification of  
employment. 
Even in sectors where high-profile steps have been taken to formalise the 
employment of  migrant workers to ensure fair wages, enforcement often 
continues to fall short. In Thailand, for example, migrants make up the vast 
majority of  workers in the USD 6 billion fishing industry, which has faced 
intense pressure to reform in recent years due to reports of  severe abuses. 
In response, the Thai government made substantial efforts to amend its 
legislative frameworks to provide fishers with expanded labour protections, as 
they had previously been excluded from many of  the labour rights afforded to 
workers in other sectors. However, recent research by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) shows that systematic abuses against migrants persist and 
continue to be most commonly related to payment of  wages.39
36 E Menegatti, Protecting Migrant Domestic Workers: The international legal framework at a 
glance, ILO, Geneva, 2016.
37 B Anderson, Worker, Helper, Auntie, Maid? Working conditions and attitudes experienced by 
migrant domestic workers in Thailand and Malaysia, ILO, Bangkok, 2016.
38 J Wells, Protecting the Wages of  Migrant Construction Workers, Engineers Against Poverty, 
London, 2016.
39 J Judd, S Chotikajan, and K Emmons, Baseline Research Findings on Fishers and Seafood 
Workers in Thailand, ILO, Bangkok, 2018.
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Part of  the challenge in reinforcing labour protection for migrants is that deeply 
entrenched discriminatory attitudes cannot easily be legislated away. Research 
in Asia suggests that negative public perceptions have a strong impact on the 
application of  laws regulating the wages of  migrant workers.40 Authorities 
may react differently to cases of  wage theft when they involve migrants as it 
is rationalised that they are still receiving better wages than they would in their 
countries of  origin. In particular, officials may be less sympathetic towards 
undocumented migrant workers who are underpaid as they are viewed as having 
brought the problem upon themselves.41 
Wage Abuses Regularly Feature in Forced Labour and  
Human Trafficking 
Given the lack of  reliable data on human trafficking and forced labour, there 
have been increased efforts to produce more robust macro-level estimates 
of  prevalence. After several years of  discursive competition between the two 
organisations, the ILO and Walk Free Foundation jointly produced the Global 
Estimates of  Modern Slavery in 2017. However, researchers have continued 
to raise concerns about the validity of  the methodological approach, noting 
problems with the limited source data to support extrapolation to the global 
level, the artifice created by dichotomising between free and forced labour, 
the uncomfortable fusing of  forced marriage and forced labour, and other 
concerns.42 
Putting these important questions aside, the large primary dataset of  the Global 
Estimates of  Modern Slavery does provide some interesting findings on the labour 
rights abuses faced by workers. Though the study makes a distinction that is 
difficult to justify vis-à-vis international labour standards—between ‘forced 
labour exploitation’ and ‘forced sexual exploitation’—it does reveal that the 
most common form of  abuse within the former is related to wages. Among 
the estimated victims of  forced labour exploitation, nearly one-third of  victims 
were coerced through forms of  wage theft, including non-payment of  wages 
and financial penalties. This data does not fully capture the range of  everyday 
abuses experienced by migrant workers but it does suggest that a large portion 
of  even the most severe cases of  exploitation are fundamentally linked to wage 
theft.
40 M Tunon and N Baruah, ‘Public Attitudes towards Migrant Workers in Asia’, Migration 
and Development, vol. 1, issue 1, 2012, pp. 149-162, https://doi.org/10.1080/2163232
4.2012.718524.
41 Ibid.
42 D Mügge, ‘40.3 Million Slaves? Four reasons to question the new Global Estimates 
of  Modern Slavery’, openDemocracy, 17 October 2017.
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An increasing number of  sectoral studies are also being undertaken to assess the 
prevalence of  forced labour in high-risk industries. The ILO released a survey of  
the Thai fishing sector in 2013, which identified a substantial number of  fishers 
in conditions of  forced labour and investigated the reasons why these situations 
occurred. This analysis contributed to an important change in understanding 
of  the nature of  exploitation in the fishing industry. High-profile media stories 
recounting how helpless migrants were deceived, drugged, or even physically 
forced to get on-board fishing boats and then taken out to sea were found 
to represent a very small portion of  cases. In opposition to these narratives, 
the study found that nearly three-quarters of  the workers experiencing forced 
labour were recruited willingly to work in fishing but had their wages withheld, 
preventing them from leaving until they were paid.43
One very direct source of  data on the nature of  exploitation experienced by 
migrant workers is the complaint cases they file with legal assistance providers. 
Since 2011, over 30 Migrant Worker Resource Centres (MRCs) have been set up 
in six countries across Southeast Asia to increase access to justice for migrant 
workers and provide other forms of  assistance. The MRCs support migrants 
to seek remedies for abuses during recruitment and employment, including for 
cases of  forced labour and trafficking.
As the MRC data became more robust, an action research project was initiated 
to make use of  the improved evidence base. In total, primary data from over 
1,000 complaints involving more than 7,000 migrant workers was analysed. More 
than half  of  the cases in destination countries were related to types of  wage 
theft, including non-payment and underpayment of  wages and wages below 
the legal minimum. This latter type of  grievance was found to be particularly 
common for migrant workers, partially due to the enactment of  highly 
publicised minimum wage legislation in Thailand and Malaysia. Establishing a 
clear statutory minimum provided an important means for migrant workers to 
assert their labour rights.44
A substantial portion of  the complaints received by MRCs showed indications 
of  forced labour, and many were explicitly identified as such by case managers. 
This suggests that efforts to identify more routine abuses are necessary to 
effectively identify and assist severely exploited migrants. Criminal justice 
responses to human trafficking are unlikely to be successful in addressing this 
need. This is partially because most migrants who are faced with situations of  
abuse tend to seek practical resolutions, such as disbursement of  unpaid wages, 
rather than punitive sanctions for offenders. Inclusion of  the right to pursue 
43 S Chantavanich et al., Employment Practices and Working Conditions in Thailand’s Fishing 
Sector, ILO, Bangkok, 2013.
44 Harkins and Åhlberg.
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financial remedies as a knock-on to criminal prosecutions has not proven very 
successful as it is not a function that criminal justice systems are typically well-
equipped to handle.45 
Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery Frameworks are  
Ill-suited for Promoting Social Justice 
Despite the rhetoric about human trafficking being a non-partisan issue, 
research has shown that anti-trafficking responses are frequently politicised.46 
A notable historical pattern has been the comfort with which conservative 
politicians and think tanks have adopted the issue to further their agendas. The 
Bush administration made trafficking a priority largely because it supported the 
promotion of  the evangelical Christian position that all sex work is inherently 
coercive and must be abolished.47 This policy was linked to the larger moral goals 
of  reinstating traditional gender roles, the sanctity of  marriage, and heterosexual 
norms within American society, as well as extending these arrangements around 
the world.48 Though some efforts to establish a labour approach to anti-
trafficking were made during the Obama presidency,49 the puritanical 
fixation with ‘sex trafficking’ has proven to be an immutable feature of  US 
policy. 
More recently, the Heritage Foundation, a highly influential conservative think 
tank, has fought to keep attention on human trafficking within the Trump 
administration, recognising it as a key tool for promoting American foreign 
policy objectives.50 Their concerns appear largely unfounded as the Trump 
White House has avidly embraced the human trafficking cause. President Trump 
45 N Wongsamuth, ‘Thailand’s human traffickers flout 99% of  court orders to compensate 
victims’, Reuters, 15 October 2019, retrieved 31 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-thailand-trafficking-compensation-exc/exclusive-thailands-human-
traffickers-flout-99-of-court-orders-to-compensate-victims-idUSKBN1WU00P.
46 J A Chuang, ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of  Human Trafficking Law’, 
American Journal of  International Law, vol. 108, no. 4, 2014, pp. 609—649, https://doi.
org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.108.4.0609.
47 Y C Zimmerman, ‘Christianity and Human Trafficking’, Religion Compass, vol. 5, issue 
10, 2011, pp. 567-578, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2011.00309.x.
48 Ibid.
49 D J Greuner, ‘Counteracting the Bias: The Department of  Labor’s unique opportunity 
to combat human trafficking’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 126, no. 4, 2013, pp. 1012–1033.
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has justified his policies militarising border management and dramatically 
expanding immigration enforcement by making repeated references to women 
being trafficked across the border from Mexico ‘tied up, with duct tape on their 
faces, put in the backs of  vans’. The rhetoric in no way reflects the circumstances 
of  the vast majority of  identified trafficking cases in the United States and is 
particularly ironic given that the administration has made it increasingly 
difficult for migrant trafficking survivors to seek visas and protection services 
to remain in the country. 51
Staking its own claim within the anti-trafficking discourse, the United Kingdom 
has sought to reference its historical legacy in the abolitionist movement against 
slavery by supporting the rebranding of  all forms of  exploitation under the 
umbrella term ‘modern slavery’. Former UK Prime Minister Theresa May 
promoted efforts to combat modern slavery as a key focus of  her foreign policy 
agenda. However, the bitter taste left by these efforts in countries where the 
United Kingdom holds a violent and exploitative colonial legacy has not gone 
unnoticed by scholars.52 Moreover, implementing the policy while at the same 
time promoting a hostile environment towards migrants within its borders has 
only been reconciled through semantic obfuscation. The embrace of  modern 
slavery language has been described as a ‘discourse of  depoliticization’, raising 
the bar for what can be classified as unacceptable working conditions and 
absolving the state from responsibility for its role in creating the vulnerabilities 
that lead to exploitation, particularly for migrant workers.53
The ease with which the human trafficking framework fits with a conservative 
political agenda suggests that it is largely unsuitable for promoting the expansion 
of  economic and social justice for migrant workers. Extensive ratification of  the 
UN Trafficking Protocol continues to be lauded for increasing global attention 
to exploitation.54 However, its framing of  the issue as resulting from criminality 
has served as a convenient distraction from a global economic model reliant 
upon acceptance of  an immensely uneven distribution of  wealth. Rather than 
highlighting these structural inequalities, the trafficking discourse rationalises 
51 J Krajeski, ‘The Hypocrisy of  Trump’s Anti-Trafficking Argument for a Border Wall’, 
The New Yorker, 5 February 2019, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/
the-hypocrisy-of-trumps-anti-trafficking-argument-for-a-border-wall.
52 S Okyere, ‘Fielding the wrong ball – culture as a cause of  “modern slavery”’, 
openDemocracy, 8 October 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/beyond-
trafficking-and-slavery/fielding-wrong-ball-culture-as-cause-of-modern-slavery.
53 B Anderson and R Andrijasevic, ‘Sex, Slaves and Citizens: The politics of  anti- 
trafficking’, Soundings, no. 40, 2008, pp. 135-145, https://doi.org/10.3898/ 
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54 A T Gallagher, ‘Two Cheers for the Trafficking Protocol’, Anti-Trafficking Review, issue 
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exploitation of  migrant workers to be an aberration, diverting attention from 
the more systemic changes to labour relations that are required.
Need for a More Pragmatic Response to the Exploitation of 
Migrant Workers
Problems with the lack of  clarity on what constitutes human trafficking have 
been a major obstacle to identification since the UN Trafficking Protocol was 
first adopted.55 The three elements of  ‘act’, ‘means’, and ‘purpose’ are inevitably 
interpreted in a range of  different ways when applied in practice. In the real 
world, there is no easy opposition to be found between free and unfree labour. 
A binary separation of  human trafficking from other forms of  labour requires 
a judgement to be made about whether various conditions are considered 
exploitative or not, and what practices rise to the level of  coercion, in a vast 
number of  different contexts.56
Another obstacle to operationalising the concepts of  forced labour, human 
trafficking, and modern slavery, is that they are too abstract for survivors to 
self-identify. As noted in the ILO’s survey guidelines on forced labour: ‘Self-
identification of  victims of  forced labour is not possible, mainly because 
the concept is too complex. Even in countries where campaigns have raised 
awareness of  the issue using a specific terminology (such as “slave labour” in 
Brazil), it is not possible to rely on selecting respondents with a filter question 
using self-identification, as most victims do not recognize themselves as victims 
of  forced labour or trafficking.’57 The conceptual intricacies involved require that 
cases be identified by a third party, significantly limiting the agency of  survivors 
themselves to denounce abuses. This has also contributed to a lopsided focus 
on exploitation in the sex industry due to moral panics created by some of  the 
actors involved.58
55 Ibid.
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Key to addressing a larger share of  the abuses occurring is that migrants clearly 
understand when they have experienced a violation of  their rights and are able 
to come forward to lodge a complaint. In that regard, wage-related abuses can 
be considered a much more straightforward offense than human trafficking. 
In many cases, basic numeracy skills would be sufficient for a migrant worker 
to understand when they do not receive the wages they were promised. While 
indirect forms of  wage theft can be more complex, they are still not comparable 
with the cryptic process for identification of  victims of  trafficking. This 
requires application of  loosely defined concepts such as ‘exploitation’, which 
is not provided within the UN Trafficking Protocol itself  nor typically well-
understood by trafficked persons or criminal justice officials.59 
In addition, addressing wage theft does not sensationalise the abuse of  migrant 
workers, which could contribute to more cases being lodged and remedied. Part 
of  the problem with enforcing modern slavery legislation is that it has had the 
effect of  increasing the threshold for what can be considered exploitation to 
dizzying heights. The concept carries with it such baggage in its connection with 
historical chattel slavery that it may be considered inappropriate to pursue such 
a case if  the abuse is not extremely severe. While being found guilty of  wage 
theft would certainly hold stigma for an employer, it does not carry the same 
risk of  hyperbole in describing the abuse. Moreover, it does not force migrants 
to accept being branded a ‘slave’, a particularly sensitive term in countries which 
were directly affected by the historic phenomenon.60 
Effective Strategies to Reduce Wage Theft against Migrants 
are Available
Unlike the enigmatic issue of  human trafficking, proven approaches for 
addressing wage theft against migrant workers already exist.61 They only 
require the political will to shift the response to exploitation towards enabling 
a fairer distribution of  income, rather than penalising criminal transgressions. 
Fundamentally, this involves increasing the power of  migrant workers within 
their employment relationships so that they are less dependent on employers 
and can assert their rights to equitable wages and working conditions.
59 A T Gallagher and M McAdam, The Concept of  ‘Exploitation’ in the Trafficking in Persons 
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One clear starting place is ensuring that effective preventative measures against 
wage theft are enacted through labour protection laws. Establishing robust wage 
protections that apply equally to migrants, such as fair and inclusive minimum 
wage setting, rules on regularity of  pay, limitations on allowable wage deductions, 
requiring written pay slips/electronic payments, addressing discriminatory pay 
practices, adopting chain liability rules, and protecting workers from retaliatory 
dismissal are proven regulatory means for reducing wage theft. In the State of  
New Jersey, for instance, a Wage Theft Act was recently passed which requires 
the provision of  a written statement of  wage rights and stipulates that any 
disciplinary action taken against a worker within 90 days of  filing a complaint is 
presumptively considered retaliation. Under Brazil’s Labour Code, contractors 
can be held accountable for wage violations committed by their sub-contractors 
based upon a system of  joint liability.62
Extending social protection coverage to all migrant workers is also needed to 
provide a financial safety net so that they can leave situations of  wage theft. 
Social security systems around the world were typically designed to provide 
protection to workers on a territorial basis. As a rule, they have not been 
sufficiently adapted to the changes in global labour markets that have increased 
the volume and impermanence of  labour migration across international borders. 
As a consequence, many of  the eligibility requirements to receive benefits either 
explicitly exclude or create significant obstacles for migrants to avail themselves 
of  their rights (e.g. citizenship, legal documentation, minimum qualifying 
periods, and sectoral exclusions). When compounded by common problems 
with compliance, a large proportion of  migrants are left without access to 
protection and are vulnerable when faced with a sudden loss of  income.63
Coupling these statutory protections with proactive and targeted labour 
inspections to ensure enforcement would have a substantial impact if  
inspectorates were provided with sufficient resources and firewalls with 
immigration status were maintained. Research on wage compliance has found 
that employers decide on whether to follow wage regulations by balancing 
the expected costs of  the mandated wage against those of  non-compliance.64 
However, the likelihood of  substantial financial penalties has steadily reduced 
in many countries due to the heavily stretched staffing and resources of  
inspectorates. For example, decades of  declining enforcement capacity in the 
62 J Well and M Graça Prado, What Can Be Learned From Systems of  Wage Protection in China, 
EU, US and Latin America?, Engineers Against Poverty, London, 2019.
63 B Harkins, ‘Social Protection for Migrant Workers in Thailand’, in J W Huguet (ed.), 
Thailand Migration Report 2014, UN Thematic Working Group on Migration, Bangkok, 
2014.
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United States means that just 1,100 investigators in the Wage and Hour Division 
of  the Department of  Labor are now responsible for protecting 135 million 
workers.65 The global trend of  increased outsourcing of  business operations and 
misclassification of  employment status requires greater investment in labour 
market enforcement to support investigation and prosecution of  companies 
seeking to evade their financial responsibilities as employers.66 
Even so, the vast differences between de jure wage protections and the realities 
experienced by migrant workers suggest that the problem of  wage theft is not 
likely to be resolved through government regulation alone. Changing public 
attitudes towards migrants in destination countries has also proven essential 
to reducing illegal pay practices due to the high prevalence of  discriminatory 
views.67 Reviews of  the source of  these attitudes have found them to be heavily 
influenced by representations of  migrants as a symbolic threat.68 Substantively 
altering this perception requires building greater understanding of  the positive 
contributions of  migrants within the public sphere and increasing social 
cohesion through the full inclusion of  migrants in the socio-cultural life of  their 
communities. 
Labour organising has also proven to be an effective strategy for responding 
to wage theft against migrant workers.69 Research in Australia, where 
underpayment of  wages is a systemic problem faced by migrant workers, has 
pointed to the central importance of  trade unions in providing migrants with 
access to redress. While the study found that the number of  migrant trade union 
members is relatively low, those who had joined a union were nearly three times 
as likely to pursue a case to recover wages due.70 As a supplement to more 
traditional approaches, worker-driven social responsibility has recently emerged 
as a potentially promising new model for migrant worker organising, involving 
legally binding agreements between workers and corporate buyers to help 
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org/10.14197/atr.20121557.
70 B Farbenblum and L Berg, Wage Theft in Silence: Why migrant workers do not recover their 
unpaid wages in Australia, Migrant Worker Justice Initiative, Sydney, 2018.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW 15 (2020): 42-62
60
ensure fair wages.71 However, the significant obstacles to migrants unionising 
will need to be overcome, including the extensive outsourcing, informality, and 
precarity of  their employment.
Liberalising labour migration governance regimes is another well-established 
measure for reducing the risk of  wage theft. Eliminating tied-visas and work 
permits provides migrant workers with the opportunity to lodge grievances 
and freely pursue other employment when they are not properly remunerated 
for their work. Although unrestricted labour market access for migrants is a 
relatively rare policy position, more flexible systems in countries such as Sweden 
and Canada show that greater labour mobility can lower the potential for abuse 
without substantially depressing the wages or productivity of  the labour force as 
a whole. Conversely, in countries like Malaysia where no changes of  employment 
are permitted, exploitation of  migrant workers continues to flourish.72
A final key means for reducing wage abuses is ensuring that fair remedies are 
accessible in the form of  recovery of  unpaid wages and financial compensation. 
A significant part of  the reason why migrants are reluctant to participate in 
criminal prosecutions of  trafficking cases is that they tend to be time-consuming, 
legalistic, and focus primarily on achieving penal sanctions against offenders, 
which is typically not the outcome migrants are concerned with. Research has 
shown that many migrants experiencing abuse seek financial remedies so that 
they can move on with their lives.73 In addition to ensuring timely and equitable 
settlements, migrant workers should be provided with compensatory amounts 
for the abuses suffered. Establishing substantial financial penalties for wage theft 
would provide a meaningful deterrent, helping to discourage repeat offenses by 
making them cost-prohibitive.
Conclusion
There is very limited evidence that the adoption and application of  the UN 
Trafficking Protocol has been successful in ameliorating the scale or severity 
of  exploitation experienced by migrant workers. Addressing the problem more 
effectively requires a clearer focus on the basic reasons why these abuses occur. 
In the vast majority of  cases, it is not because of  the actions of  transnational 
criminal syndicates who abuse migrant workers as part of  a clandestine 
enterprise, as suggested in the framing of  the Protocol. Rather, it is the result 
of  deeply inequitable power relations between migrant workers and employers, 
71 M Åhlberg, ‘Worker-Driven Social Responsibility: Exploring a new model for tackling 
labour abuse in supply chains’, Focus on Labour Exploitation (FLEX), London, 2020.
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which supports the defrauding of  wages as a standard function of  labour 
migration governance regimes.
Interpreting exploitation of  migrant workers as a criminal abnormality within 
this imbalanced system of  exchange has obstructed the development of  more 
practical and effective responses. It is no secret that the basic motivation for 
employment of  migrants is to keep wages low in order to maximise the profitability 
of  firms. However, this is obscured by the human trafficking framework, which 
identifies individual cases of  extreme exploitation as unacceptable—with the 
effect of  justifying the inequities of  the global economy as a whole. 
A more transformative approach to these issues cannot be limited to severe 
cases of  exploitation that make international headlines and trigger corporate 
social responsibility initiatives. Instead, it would necessarily have to engage with 
the ‘everyday’ vulnerabilities to abuse that currently exist for the vast majority 
of  migrant workers. These are principally the result of  illiberal migration 
governance systems, exclusions from labour and social protections, lack of  
opportunities for worker organising, limitations in access to justice, and other 
structural factors that reduce the likelihood of  migrants receiving their fair share 
of  the benefits of  their labour. 
To be sure, an increased focus on wage theft would not provide a comprehensive 
response to all forms of  exploitation of  migrant workers covered by the 
frameworks of  forced labour, human trafficking, and modern slavery. Ideally, 
expanded efforts to address wage theft would be part of  a broader shift towards 
a labour rights approach to these issues, as there would still be a need to bring 
other tools to bear for abuses that fall outside the scope of  wage-related matters. 
However, the specificity of  the concept can be considered a key strength in 
that the identification of  abuses and provision of  remedies is clearer than for 
the existing frameworks for countering exploitation. As a result, improving 
the response to wage theft against migrants would lead to better working 
conditions for the vast missing middle who experience more commonplace 
forms of  abuse and help to diminish the enabling environment for severe 
exploitation to occur.
Most importantly, the focus on a more equitable distribution of  wages 
would redirect attention to a core issue at stake in the era of  globalisation. 
Greater efforts to address wage theft against migrant workers would contribute 
to an expansion of  economic and social justice for a large segment of  the 
world’s most vulnerable workers. The extent to which this will be realised is 
not likely to be dependent on prosecutions by specialised anti-trafficking 
police forces, the social responsibility of  multinational corporations, or the 
technological solutions of  Silicon Valley, but rather the ability of  migrants 
to voice meaningful demands for fair remuneration of  their work.
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